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Manipulation or education? : symbolic language, belief system and the Truman Doctrine

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The question arises in the analysis of foreign policy decision making regarding how consensus or approval by the public is attained for policies. Some authors have suggested that consensus is obtained through the manipulation of opinion by decision makers. One case often cited as an example of manipulation is the 1947 announcement of the Truman Doctrine.

In determining the validity of these arguments a review was conducted of the language of the doctrine and the interpretations of newspaper columnists. In addition, a review of personal documents of the decision makers was conducted to determine their

impressions.

The data compiled from these sources indicate that the authors who claim manipulation might have exaggerated the case.

MANIPULATION OR EDUCATION? SYMBOLIC LANGUAGE, BELIEF SYSTEM AND THE TRUMAN DOCTRINE

by

JOHN GUNN TILSON

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INTRODUCTION

The decision by the Truman Administration in February and March of 1947 to provide aid and assistance to Greece and Turkey has been heralded as a landmark event in American foreign policy. The announcement of the Truman Doctrine has been labeled as "an incomparable assumption of responsibility, in the United States' own right, of a kind never assumed before."[1] Essentially, the responsibilities that the United States assumed were those of a principle actor in a balance of power, a role which has remained constant for the United States until today.[2]

While many of the historical works on the subject of the Truman Doctrine have lauded the "cooperative effort"[3] between the various government departments, the press, Congress and the public, as an example of a consensus in foreign policy, the Truman Doctrine and its so-called consensus are not without controversy. One body of literature has suggested that the consensus among the press and the public was created or "manipulated"[4], and that the primary instrument of this political control or manipulation was "domestic propaganda"[5] disseminated among the press and the public by policy making elites.

If one is to either prove or disprove the contentions of those who argue the "manipulation thesis"[6], one needs to analyze a number of factors pertinent to the discussion. To begin with, both the terms manipulation and propaganda are used in the works of these manipulation theorists; it is important to understand their meanings. Webster's Third International Dictionary defines manipulation as: "management of the use of unfair, scheming or underhanded methods especially for one's own advantage." Webster further defines propaganda as:

> doctrines, ideas, arguments, facts or allegations spread by deliberate effort through any medium of communication in order to further one's cause or to damage an opposing cause.

The implication is that manipulation of opinion through the use of propaganda to gain support for foreign policies is deceptive and therefore wrong. While this notion might certainly be a sufficient question for a thesis in itself, it is merely a point of departure in this case. This paper will instead focus on one event in American foreign policy and evaluate the criticisms of the body of theorists who advocate the manipulation theory. If these manipulation theorists are in fact correct, one might expect to find evidence to suggest that administration policy making elites used

> unfair, scheming and underhanded...doctrines, ideas, arguments, facts and allegations spread by deliberate effort through any medium of communication in order to further [their] own cause or damage an opposing cause.

The analysis, therefore, will center on discussions of the language used in the public presentations, theories of language and communication in politics, and perceptions of the central actors in the decision making process to determine the extent to which this language could be labeled propaganda.

This analysis will begin with a review of the historical interpretations of the formulations and implementations of the policies proposed by the Truman Doctrine.

FOOTNOTES

[1]Joseph M. Jones, The Fifteen Weeks (New York: The Viking Press, 1955) p. 161.

[2]Louis Rene Beres, Reason and Realpolitik: U.S. Foreign Policy and World Order (Lexington, MA: D.C. Heath and Company, 1984) pp. 1-2.

[3]Jones, The Fifteen Weeks pp. vii, 12, 150.

[4]Micheal Leigh, Mobilizing Consent: Public Opinion and American Foreign Policy, 1937-1947 (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1976) p. 141; Joyce and Gabriel Kolko, The Limits of Power: The World and United States Foreign Policy, 1945-1954 (New York: Harper & Row Publishers, 1972) p. 333.

[5]Richard M. Freeland, The Truman Doctrine and the Origins of McCarthyism: Foreign Policy, Domestic Relations and Internal Security, 1946-1948 (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1972) p. 88.

[6]Leigh, Mobilizing Consent p. 160. Among those authors considered to be "manipulation theorists" are Richard J. Barnet, Intervention and Revolution: The United States in the Third World (New York: World Publishing Co., 1968); Doris A. Graber, Public Opinion, The President, and Foreign Policy: Four Case Studies from the Formative Years (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc., 1968); David Horowitz, Free World Colossus (New York: Hill and Wang, Inc., 1965); Joyce and Gabriel Kolko, The Limits of Power: The World and United States Foreign Policy, 1945-1954 (New York: Harper & Row Publishers, 1972).

II

HISTORICAL INTERPRETATION

Much of 1946 had been taken up in Washington with negative reactions to Soviet policies. The Soviets reportedly were applying "direct pressure"[1] to Iran and Turkey. In addition, the Soviets were making hostile speeches and encroaching on other countries including Greece and the nations of Eastern Europe.[2] These events led to a recognition on the part of the State Department and the Truman Administration that a new approach would have to be taken in dealing with the Soviet Union.

The focus of the new approach which the Administration chose to take was outlined in a long dispatch from Moscow by Soviet expert and State Department official George Kennan. Kennan's report viewed Soviet intransigence in terms of the Soviet perception of an innate antagonism with the Western World, and that this antagonism would continue until the Soviet Union had destroyed the capitalist nations. It is from this antagonism and its underlying ideology which Kennan suggested that Soviet foreign policy be viewed. Kennan argued that this underlying ideology would cause the Soviets to continue their policies of expansion. They would be constantly attempting to gain new areas of control

through violence and subversion. The response by the United States, according to Kennan should be one of attempting to contain the Soviets in those spheres of influence they have already attained.

Kennan believed that the most rational method for achieving this "containment" was to grant aid to those countries which had suffered because of the war. Assumedly these were the areas which were most vulnerable to any type of Soviet incursions. The Kennan report argued that Soviet expansion had to be countered by promoting the "security" of those countries not under Soviet domination.[3]

In addition to the Kennan report, the attitude of the Truman Administration towards the Soviet Union was somewhat influenced by the British attitude towards the Soviets. This British attitude was expressed by Prime Minister Winston Churchill in a speech at Fulton, Missouri in which he called for, "an alliance of English speaking peoples" and an avoidance of appeasement.[4] Thus, the role of being a principal actor in the international balance of power was thrust upon the United States. Under the leadership of Secretary of State James Byrnes, the U.S. announced its policy of "firmness and patience," in which the American position would be a firm stance to induce the Soviets to "play the game in the American way."[5]

Because of a hostile Congress and a public whose opinions on the issue ranged from apathy to isolationism,[6] however, the Truman Administration was not fully able to apply the type of pressure it would have liked; the costs and commitments of such pressure would not have been tolerated in the American Post WWII climate of isolationism.[7] To pursue the policy of containment suggested by Kennan something needed to change. This change came in February of 1947.

On February 21, 1947 the British Ambassador in Washington, Lord Inverchappel, delivered two notes to American officials in the State Department; one note concerned Greece and the other concerned Turkey. The notes essentially stated that Great Britain, strained by the costs of the war, would no longer be able to meet its commitments in these two countries. Britain had been supporting the Greek government with assistance for the civil war that they had been engaged in with rebels who were presumed to be sponsored by the Soviets. The British had also been assisting Turkey which was faced with an increase of Soviet troops along its border with the U.S.S.R. Spanier points out, "the import of the British notes was clear: that a Soviet breakthrough could be prevented only by an all out American commitment."[8] This, of course, meant that funds would have to be obtained by making a request to Congress.

While this American commitment was apparently necessary, the problem of an apathetic public and a hostile Congress still existed. In the week immediately following the presentation of the British notes a group of leading Senators and Representatives met in the White House to hear then Secretary of State Marshall's summary of the situation. Present at the meeting were some of the most influential members of Congress, including members of the Senate Appropriations and Foreign Relations Committees, and members of the House Appropriations and Foreign Affairs Committees. The President wanted to get the reaction of these individuals to the problem, as their influence and approval would be vital if aid were to be administered in Greece and Turkey.

Secretary Marshall began the presentation to the Congressmen, but as Jones argues, his rather "dry and economical terms" and "cryptic presentation" of the problem did not serve the desired purpose of convincing the Congressmen as to the urgency of the aid to Greece and Turkey. In fact, it seems that Marshall's presentation had left the "overall impression that aid should be extended to Greece on grounds of loyalty and humanitarianism and to Turkey to strengthen Britain's position in the Middle East."[9] At this point Mr. Acheson was given the floor and proceeded to describe the situation in somewhat different terms. Acheson rhetorically painted a picture of an aggressive Soviet Union "encroaching" on Turkey, Germany

and other "democratic" states while continuing to apply "pressure" on Greece, inching toward the ultimate goal of "domination" of the Middle East and "penetration" into South Asia and Africa.[10]

This emotional language served the purpose. Regarding the Acheson presentation, Jones notes,

> When he finished a profound silence ensued that lasted perhaps ten seconds. It was broken by the voice of Senator Vandenburg. Slowly and with gravity, Vandenburg said that he had been greatly impressed, even shaken by what he had heard... He felt that it was absolutely necessary that any request of Congress for funds and authority to aid Greece and Turkey be accompanied by a message to Congress, and an explanation to the American people, in which the grim facts of the larger situation should be laid publicly on the line as they had been at their meeting there that day.[11]

Since Vandenburg had traditionally been one of the leading advocates of the isolationist attitude it was clear that Acheson's presentation had a profound effect. Seeing how effective this type of presentation could be in overcoming the isolationist and apathetic mood, President Truman appointed Undersecretary Acheson to head the staff which was to draft his speech.

With Acheson having been assigned to the State, War, Navy coordinating Committee which was to form the information program from which the Truman speech was to be drafted, it was expected that the presentation to the public would be full of the same emotional rhetoric which was used by Acheson in his presentation to the Congressional leaders. The result of the S.W.N.C.C.'s work was a paper titled,

Public Information Program on United States Aid to Greece, and it was from this document that the rhetoric was

> virtually lifted word for word and incorporated in the first draft of the President's message..... It survived all subsequent revisions almost intact, most of the few alterations being additions by Acheson.[12]

Primarily because of Acheson's treatment of the presentation and Vandenburg's later suggestion regarding the need for public disclosure,

> The State Department Public Information officers recommended a program to portray the word conflict between free and totalitarian or imposed forms of government in order to make the American people recognize the importance of the Greek crisis.[13]

An understanding of the role of the Public Information officers in the drafting of the S.W.N.C.C. document and the speech by President Truman is important for this paper, and is well discussed by Jones. He notes that, in a rare show of cooperation,

> The policy-operations officers were among the most effective in making suggestions in the tone and content of the public approach, and the information officers were equally effective in analyzing strategic and political considerations....The information officers with their sensibilities attuned to the public, made a powerful contribution to the Truman Doctrine.[14]

The draft of the Truman speech by the S.W.N.C.C. underwent some further minor revisions by Clark Clifford, who at the time was Special Counsel to the President. Many of the changes which Clifford proposed dealt with the tone of the message. Clifford, as did Acheson, saw the value in a "dramatic"[15] presentation of the situation to the American people. He argued that the speech should contain

language which could serve to present the situation to the public in the "strongest possible" terms. Jones cites some examples of Clifford's inclusions,

> This is a serious course upon which we embark. I would not recommend it except that the alternative is more serious....The seeds of totalitarian regimes are nurtured by misery and want. They spread and grow in the evil soil of poverty and strife. They reach their full growth when the hope of a people for a better life has died.[16]

It is argued that this type of language, with its emotional content was included in the draft of President Truman's speech to persuade those individuals who might not be persuaded by a precise rational presentation of the facts. This type of presentation had failed once before, when Secretary Marshall attempted to explain the situation to the group of Congressional leaders. Only when Mr. Acheson presented the problem in more dramatic language did those present accept and, in fact, understand the need for aid to Greece and Turkey. More importantly those who heard the presentations at the White House were those who presumably had some interest and attention to foreign affairs. If they did not respond to the factual presentation of the problem, it was very unlikely that an apathetic public would respond to such a presentation either. Hence, the Truman Doctrine was couched in broad policy terms and intended to "scare the hell out of"[17] the American people.

The setting for the Truman speech on March 12th, 1947 was extremely dramatic. Jones notes that the House floor and its galleries were jammed.

> Every clerk, secretary, or functionary on Capitol Hill whose familiar face would get him past a guard at a door was on the floor.[18]

At 12:45 p.m. the President pro tempore of the Senate, Senator Vandenburg, and other members of the Senate entered and Vandenburg mounted the rostrum. At 12:57 p.m. the members of the President's Cabinet entered the room, at 1:00 p.m. the Speaker of the House announced the President, who was escorted in by three Senators and three Representatives. Truman entered to a loud ovation and mounted the rostrum. The first words he spoke implied the threat and conveyed the urgency which he desired to express to the world.

> Mr. President, Mr. Speaker, Members of the Congress of the United States, the gravity of the situation which confronts the world today necessitates my appearance before a joint session of Congress. The foreign policy and the national security of this country are involved.[19]

Truman went on to discuss his specific proposals for supplying economic and military assistance to Greece and Turkey. Interestingly, and perhaps for purposeful reasons, every time the President mentioned Greece it was proceeded or followed by the adjective "democratic" in some form or another.

> Greece must have assistance if it is to become a self-respecting democracy....There is no country to which democratic Greece can turn....No other nation is willing and able to provide necessary support for a democratic Greek government.[20]

Truman also discussed the importance of maintaining the "national integrity" of Turkey and the importance of that integrity to the preservation of order in the Middle East. Using such terms in discussing Greece and Turkey was an interesting device to suggest a strong need for a United States commitment.

Beyond the questionable message which Truman was imparting regarding these specific areas of the world, the Truman Doctrine in its wider context addressed the notion of a United States foreign policy that must be,

> ...willing to help free peoples to maintain their free institutions and their national integrity against aggressive movements that seek to impose upon them totalitarian regimes. This is no more than a frank recognition that totalitarian regimes imposed on free peoples, by direct or indirect aggression undermine the foundations of international peace and hence the security of the United States.... I believe it must be the policy of the United States to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures.[21]

After making these allusions to a threat to the "national security" of the United States caused by "aggressive movements" attempting to "subjugate" a "free democratic" Greek state, the President requested from Congress approximately $400 million in economic and military assistance.

Following the speech the President briskly exited from the House floor. His speech was met with applause but not the boisterous response which usually followed a Presidential address. Although the impact of the President's address

was not immediately felt, it was not slow in coming. Jones notes regarding the response to the address, "it was tremendous, somewhat confused, and on the whole favorable."[22] Poll data collected in the weeks following the announcement of the Truman Doctrine tend to confirm the statements made by Jones.

The survey data used in this paper was collected following the announcement of the Truman Doctrine by the American Institute of Public Opinion and the National Opinion Research Center. The results were published in issues of the journal, Public Opinion Quarterly in 1947.[23]

The first poll concerning the proposals for aid to Greece and Turkey was taken just two weeks after the March 12th speech, (see index, Table 1). While this poll does show a majority in favor of the Truman proposals, it is clear that no sweeping consensus existed regarding his proposals. Two polls taken in later months seem to suggest that the majority in favor of the Truman proposals was steadily increasing. A poll taken by the National Opinion Research Center in April of 1947[24] suggests that the percentage of support for the Truman proposals had increased from 56 to 67 percent, (see appendix, Table 2). Upon closer analysis of this poll one sees that the support is only for that part of the proposals that calls for economic aid, the proposals calling for the provision of military assistance for Greece and Turkey were disapproved overwhelmingly. A

third poll taken in June of 1947 suggests that the majority of those who favored the proposals-presumably for both economic and military aid-was increasing. This time from 56 to 66 percent percent, (see appendix, Table 3).

The historical information and the poll data appear to indicate, in general, that the policy proposals of the Truman Doctrine speech were met with a moderate approval which increased over time. This suggests that if any feelings of isolationism or apathy among the public and Congress existed at the time of the announcement, the information campaign initiated by the administration changed these feelings.

The sequence of events noted above indicates that the formulation of policy preceded any public demand for action. This is consistent with the arguments of a number of authors regarding the way foreign policy is made.[25] One assumes that foreign policy decision makers establish goals based on their interpretation and analysis of the information and then attempt to achieve those goals by the most rational or effective means.[26] If this is the case, then the Truman administration must have perceived that containment of the Soviet Union was the goal they desired to achieve, but having doubts about the public's and Congress' willingness to accept these proposals, the administration determined that it would have to initiate an

information campaign to build consensus and, thereby, support for the aid proposals.

FOOTNOTES

[1]John Spanier, American Foreign Policy Since World War II (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1980) p. 30.

[2]William C. Mallalieu, "The Origin of the Marshall Plan", Political Science Quarterly 73 (December, 1958) p. 484.

[3]Ibid.

[4]Spanier, American Foreign Policy Since World War II p. 24.

[5]Ibid.

[6]Joyce and Gabriel Kolko, The Limits of Power: The World and United States Foreign Policy, 1945-1954 (New York: Harper & Row, Publishers, 1972) p. 334.

[7]Ibid., 332-336.

[8]Spanier, American Foreign Policy Since World War II p. 24.

[9]Joseph M. Jones, The Fifteen Weeks (New York: The Viking Press, 1955) p. 139.

[10]Ibid., p. 140.

[11]Ibid., p. 142.

[12]Ibid., pp. 152-153.

[13]Mallalieu, "The Origin of the Marshall Plan", p. 484.

[14]Jones, The Fifteen Weeks p. 150.

[15]Ibid., p. 155.

[16]Ibid.

[17]Mallalieu, "The Origin of the Marshall Plan", p. 485.

[18]Jones, The Fifteen Weeks p. 17.

[19]Ibid., p. 19.

[20]Ibid., p. 20.

[21]Ibid., pp. 21-22.

[22]Ibid., p. 29.

[23]Mildred Strunk, ed., "The Quarter's Polls", Public Opinion Quarterly 11 (1947).

[24]Micheal Leigh, Mobilizing Consent: Public Opinion and American Foreign Policy, 1937-1947 (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1976) p. 143.

[25]James N. Rosenau, Public Opinion and Foreign Policy (New York: Random House, 1962); Bernard C. Cohen, The Public's Impact on Foreign Policy (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1973). Both authors argue that public opinion is often by-passed as an initial input in the policy process.

[26]Thomas L. Brewer, American Foreign Policy: A Contemporary Introduction (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1980) p. 30.

III

MANIPULATION AND SYMBOLISM

The arguably questionable way in which the public information campaign and the Truman Doctrine were formulated and presented to the public has led a number of historians to question whether the attempt to build support for the Greek-Turkish aid proposals went beyond an informational campaign. More than one of those historians has used the term manipulation in referring to the activities of those organizing the public information effort.[1] The evidence usually presented as the basis for such assertions is the use of emotional and questionable language in the public comments by officials,[2] the numerous, and arguably dubious, allusions to crisis,[3] and the difference in reactions that were to be found in the poll data when the questions were phrased in a more emotional fashion.[4] These arguments imply a massive propaganda effort on the part of the Truman administration to "sell"[5] the Greek-Turkish aid proposals to the American public.

Much literature has been written on the subject of how the government uses propaganda and language to sway an

uninformed and unaware public. The bulk of this literature concentrates on the notion of symbolism in politics. An understanding of symbolism and its application to the question of consensus building in American Foreign policy is best achieved by reviewing some of the arguments presented by the most prominent authors.

These authors argue that many of the actions which a state, especially the United States, takes are done for symbolic purposes; this includes many of the ceremonial acts, the public declarations and the various functions of the government.[6] These actions are quite often symbolic in themselves, or they include language or procedures which could be considered symbolic.

By symbolic, we mean those actions that are taken intending to elicit a non-rational response from the audience receiving the signal. Rather than a reasoned debate about the true merits of political choices, the American public is often subjected to words, phrases, settings and actions which serve to symbolize myths. These myths, having been ingrained in our consciousness since childhood by folklore, fables, songs, religion, family and entertainment media serve to arouse emotional rather than reasoned thought processes. These emotional thought processes both obscure our rational abilities and dictate our responses to what have been suggested to us as being political issues. W. Lance Bennett differentiates between

"primary process thinking" and "secondary process thinking"[7]; the latter being a rational thought process and the former being,

> projection, fantasy, the incorporation of nonverbal imagery, a high emotional content, the easy connection of disparate ideas, the failure to make underlying assumptions explicit, and the generation of multiple levels of meaning.[8]

Many types of actions, both verbal and nonverbal, can be considered symbolic. This study will focus primarily on myths, rituals, settings, institutions, threats and assurances. Certainly, the symbolic ability of these instruments is suggested merely by a casual knowledge of each. But a more thorough, specific definition is in order to understand to what extent these are symbolic.

To understand the methods by which governments elicit emotional responses from the public about political issues one needs to view the political belief system of the American public. To do this the literature on the uses of myth in American politics and society is important.

Myths are the primary method by which individuals in the government engage in communication with the public. Myths are the basic truths about any society. More precisely, they are those things that a society believes to be its basic truths. They are those things to which members of the society feel they should aspire; those things, although often ambiguous and highly emotional, which a

society can believe in. Myths are promulgated by all media, and as noted previously, are ingrained in the public consciousness. When presented to the public they produce an emotional response. Bennett notes,

> Cultural processes produce common social understandings and guide people in using these understandings to organize life situations, to respond to new social conditions, and to accept their positions in the social order.[9]

In essence, myths define societal values and ideologies, and thus contribute to a belief system for individuals who have been subjected to the same cultural processes.

Both Bennett and Murray Edelman note that some of the most pervasive myths in American society are those of liberty, freedom, democracy and citizen participation.[10] If one looks closely at these terms, and perhaps attempts to define them, one sees the ambiguity that is inherent in each term. This ambiguity aids in dissuading the audience from trying to employ a reasoned thought process about the message they are receiving. To do so would require that they define the terms, and this would prove quite taxing if not impossible. Few Americans have the time or inclination to have read much political theory. It is reasonable to assume that most are unfamiliar with the works of Mill, Locke, Rousseau or any of those who have spent time discussing these issues. In addition to, or perhaps in spite of, their ambiguity, the use of the aforementioned

terms can inspire within most of us a whole host of patriotic and nationalistic sentiments. Growing up in America, and being exposed to the various cultural and political influences which permeate our society is testimony to the ease with which these influences could be coordinated for effective political control. Knowing this, it is little wonder that arguments have been made regarding the manipulation of opinion in America.

Many of the arguments regarding the use of myth in political communication in America are bolstered by the notion of ritual behavior that governments engage in to promulgate and reinforce the public's belief in its myths. Bennett defines ritual as follows:

> A ritual can be defined as a set of routine procedures used by participants in recurring situations.
> -to establish and display the social principles (embodied in myth) that the participants agree to observe in the situation,
> -to show how those principles will be applied to specific issues in the situation, and
> -to demonstrate the reasonableness of the action.,[11]

Many authors, including Bennett and Edelman, maintain that elections and the act of voting are ritualistic in that they promulgate the myths of democracy and citizen participation.[12] Edelman notes regarding voting, "[Voting] is participation in a ritual act, however, only in a minor degree is it participation in policy formulation."[13] This notion of voting as only a minor degree of participation in policy formulation is quite

important to the argument regarding myths, rituals, and the creation of opinion in American politics. Because if ritual acts such as voting are not really as important as we have been led to believe, then what significance does any opinion which a public might express have in policy formulation. In his work, Edelman cites a number of authors who argue that elections are necessary as they provide the public with some forum that essentially makes them believe that they have actually participated in a rational policy choice. These authors cited by Edelman maintain that without some such device for achieving this goal, the legitimacy of the government would be lost.[14]

Certainly elections are not the only ritual which governments utilize as a method of political control. The raising and saluting of the flag, the reciting of a pledge of allegiance which includes such terms as liberty, freedom and justice are also ritual. Some have even mentioned that the adversarial system of the trial which is engaged in by the United States court system is itself ritualistic.[15]

Arguably then, based on this speculation regarding ritual in American politics, a case could be made that such things as the language of Presidential requests to Congress for items such as economic and military assistance are merely ritual in content. Congressmen, having been brought up in the United States and having been subjected to the same "cultural processes" are just as likely to engage in

primary process thinking as most members of the public and are just as likely to "understand" the situation in a way which is nonrational but desirable by those employing the symbols. Presidential speeches, statements before Congress, statements made in press conferences and personal appeals made by a President to a Congressman for support can also be seen as ritual; both for the symbolic language used in these communications and because of the reinforcement of the publicly held mythical beliefs about American government which these acts provide. Edelman notes,

> Political forms thus come to symbolize what large masses of men need to believe about the state to reassure themselves....The point is that every political institution and act evokes and reinforces a particular response in its audiences....In democratic countries these institutions reinforce beliefs in the reality of citizen participation in government and in the rational basis of government decisions, regardless of what is said in the course of the proceedings on particular occasions.[16]

Edelman provides us, in his explanation, with other factors to view in terms of symbolism. The institutions of government and the language that is used by these institutions in their rituals is seen as being symbolic and initiating primary process thinking by the audience. Since the focus of analysis in this paper is a specific event in American foreign policy, the Truman Doctrine, we should view the institutions whose role were most important, the settings which enhanced these institutions and the language used by them.

Perhaps the pre-eminent institution regarding foreign affairs is the office of the President. In addition to the broad formal powers which the President possesses regarding foreign affairs there is also the enormous power a President possesses in his ability to persuade. In other words, Presidents enjoy both posited and symbolic power. Perhaps the most prominent work on the subject of the President's ability to persuade is that by Richard Neustadt.

Neustadt argues that the Presidential power to persuade has its roots in a number of factors. Some of these factors are personal or individual to the person holding the office at the time. These include his logical faculties and his charm. Other factors affecting a President's ability to influence the mass and elite public are those which are inherent in the office that the individual holds. These powers include status and authority. The President himself is a symbol for every person in the country. More appropriately, the office of the President is an institution to which members of both the mass and elite publics focus their attention, hopes and fears.

> The essence of a President's persuasive task is to convince such men that what the White House wants of them is what they ought to do for their own sake and on their own authority.[17]

Perhaps the most interesting and effective device employed by individuals, especially the President, for reinforcing myths and creating threats and assurances to

the public is the political speech. If we recall that the public tends to respond to emotional stimuli, we can view political speeches in this light. Edelman notes,

> Political acts, speeches, and gestures involve mass audiences emotionally in politics while rendering them acquiescent to policy shifts through that very involvement.[18]

While it is important to note the emotive content of the language employed in these speeches, it is equally important to discuss the emotional impact of the speech itself. This is especially true in the case of a Presidential address, primarily because of the symbolism inherent in the Office of the Presidency and because of the settings that accompany a Presidential address.

Edelman argues that the settings for political acts and speeches often employ devices intended to evoke an emotional response from the audience, thus they serve as symbols to the audience. For instance, the formality of a Presidential "State of the Union" address or a speech before a joint session of Congress can serve as a symbol of the official nature of the speech and this formality can set the tone for the seriousness of the message that the speaker is delivering. The sight of the President standing at the rostrum of the Senate floor, flanked by the Vice-President and the speaker of the House, with most of the members of his cabinet and congress in session can "prove" to the audience the authority of the speaker and the importance of the message he is imparting. The remoteness of the speech

sets it apart from other types of Presidential public appearances. He is not campaigning; he is not answering questions from reporters; he is addressing the country and indeed the rest of the world. Thus, the formality of this type of Presidential speech takes the President out of his normal role as an administrator and puts him in the new role of teacher. The teaching role of the President has been carefully analyzed by Nicholas Berry who cites three functions of this role,

1. To get the attention of those who must act.
2. To get the acceptance of the goals proposed by the leader.
3. To create a commitment to act a certain way.[19]

Berry further argues,

> Teaching sets the stage for concerted action. It previews what will happen. It mobilizes energy and inflames the spirit. It guides behavior in the creation and administration of public policy. It tests the probability of success by creating a public reaction.[20]

What Berry seems to be suggesting is that the Presidential "teaching" role is intended to create opinion and is indeed, structured for that purpose. There appears to be a strong relationship between Berry's "teaching role of the President" and Leigh and Kolko's "manipulation." Edelman notes,

> The appropriateness of act to setting is normally so carefully plotted in the political realm that we are rarely conscious of the importance or the ramifications of the tie between the two.[21]

Beyond the idea of the use of appropriate institutional settings in creating symbols, is the use of

language for symbolic purposes. Indeed, language is perhaps the most evocative instrument available for creating threats and assurances to the public. Edelman notes,

> In subtle and obvious ways cultures shape vocabulary and meaning, and men respond to verbal cues....Language becomes a sequence of Pavlovian cues rather than an instrument for reasoning and analysis if situations and appropriate cue occur together.[22]

Thus, Edelman argues, language is effective as a symbol because of its ability to connote threats and assurances that serve as cues for public response. Certain words and phrases have distinct meanings to American society, especially the mass public, and tend to evoke emotional responses. Public officials, especially Presidents, having been brought up in American society and having campaigned in it are aware of these words or phrases and can employ them when they desire the public to respond in a specific way. Thus, a speech intended to direct the public towards a specific response might employ passionate language. This is especially true in a case where the public official perceives that the public might not be ready to undertake the commitment necessary to fulfill the policy proposed. Edelman notes, "language sometimes directly encourages behavior contrary to peoples interests."[23]

Presumably the public official knows which audience he is trying to get a certain response from. Different audiences will respond to different styles of speech. Edelman cites four styles of speech which "pervade the

governmental process", these are hortatory, legal, administrative and bargaining.[24] Since the focus of this paper is the effect of language and symbols on foreign policy consensus-building among the public, attention will be paid to that style of speaking best suited for appealing to a primarily uninformed and unconcerned mass public, which tends to respond to emotional stimuli.

Edelman argues that the hortatory language style is the most effective for soliciting support for policy among the mass public, and is quite often the style employed when using symbolic language. Edelman notes,

> The hortatory style consists formally of premises, inferences and conclusions, some stated and others implied. The conclusions, being promises or threats, amount to appeals for public support, and this generality of appeal is the style's most conspicuous formal element....In spite of the almost total ambiguity of the terms employed, each instance of the use of this language styled is accepted as evidence of the need for widespread support of public policy.[25]

The goal of hortatory speaking style is to stress a rational approach to a problem by emphasizing the key words. Edelman argues, "Audiences value gestures and postures consistent with rationality."[26] But often the ambiguity of the symbolic language used merely gives the impression of rationality while really creating an emotional image or stimulus for the mass public. Indeed, it is this emotional stimulus, often a threat to the country that causes the sense of a need for support.

It is important at this point to discuss who is capable of such a grand task as the determination and the distribution of symbols calculated to effect a response from the public. If, as noted previously, cultural processes dictate the way individuals in the United States perceive things, how are some individuals in a position to affect a public's perception of foreign policy issues? One must look to the numerous elite leadership theories of American government for an answer. Specifically, those relating to elitism in the foreign policy decision making processes.

Since much of the information presented in this paper has dealt with nonrational or emotional understanding of political issues as opposed to rational understandings of politics, a body of literature which addresses information and awareness levels among the public immediately suggests itself for observation. First addressed by Gabriel Almond,[27] then expanded by James Rosenau[28] and Bernard Cohen,[29] this body of literature essentially argues that if one considers the American public as a whole, approximately 75-90 percent of the public is unaware of or inattentive to foreign affairs; of the remaining 10-25 percent only a fraction of a percent are aware enough, motivated enough and associated enough to have a hand in the making of foreign policy. This establishes an elite group of individuals to whom the avenues of public information and policy formulation are

simultaneously open. This elite group serves as a focus for any analysis of alleged "manipulation" of public opinion in forming consensus or foreign policy issues. Two authors who have viewed elite arguments and done research into backgrounds of elites within the United States found eight distinctive characteristics of elites, and identified four members who drafted the Truman Doctrine as elites.[30]

The basic elite structure of foreign policy decision making is pyramid shaped. In other words, those individuals who comprise the elite groups, with the awareness, motivation and access to an audience, are at the highest level of the pyramid and comprise the smallest group. If evidence can be found that individuals within this group engaged in or intended to employ specific language to build a manipulated consensus on foreign policy issues, then the works of authors such as Barnett, Kolko, Freeland, Graber and Leigh can be substantiated. If no evidence of any intentional misleading of public perception can be found, it would be difficult to conclude the accuracy of such claims.

FOOTNOTES

[1]Micheal Leigh, Mobilizing Consent: Public Opinion and American Foreign Policy, 1937-1947 (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1976) p. 141; Joyce and Gabriel Kolko, The Limits of Power: The World and United States Foreign Policy, 1945-1954 (New York: Harper & Row Publishers, 1972) p. 333.

[2]Kolko, The Limits of Power p. 333.

[3]Richard M. Freeland, The Truman Doctrine and the Origins of McCarthyism: Foreign Policy, Domestic Relations and Internal Security, 1946-1948 (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1972) p. 89.

[4]Leigh, Mobilizing Consent p. 158.

[5]William C. Mallalieu, "The Origins of the Marshall Plan", Political Science Quarterly 73 (December, 1958) p. 485.

[6]Murray Edelman, The Symbolic Uses of Politics (Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1964) pp. 1-21; W. Lance Bennett, "Myth, Ritual and Political Control", Journal of Communications Volume 30, Number 1 (Autumn, 1980) pp. 166-167.

[7]Bennett, "Myth, Ritual and Political Control", p. 169.

[8]Ibid.

[9]Ibid., pp. 166-167.

[10]Edelman, The Symbolic Uses of Politics pp. 121-122; Bennett, "Myth, Ritual and Political Control", p. 170.

[11]Bennett, "Myth, Ritual and Political Control", p. 174.

[12]Edelman, The Symbolic Uses of Politics p. 13; Bennett, "Myth, Ritual and Political Control", pp. 176-177.

[13]Edelman, The Symbolic Uses of Politics p. 3.

[14]Ibid.

[15]Thurmond Arnold, The Symbols of American Government (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, Inc., 1962) pp. 33-104.

[16]Edelman, The Symbolic Uses of Politics p. 2.

[17]Richard Neustadt, Presidential Power (New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1980) p. 27.

[18]Edelman, The Symbolic Uses of Politics p. 15.

[19]Nicholas O. Berry, "The Foundation of Presidential Leadership: Teaching", Presidential Studies Quarterly Vol. XI, Number 1 (Winter, 1981) p. 99.

[20]Ibid.

[21]Edelman, The Symbolic Uses of Politics p. 99.

[22]Ibid., pp. 115-116.

[23]Ibid., p. 124.

[24]Ibid., p. 133.

[25]Ibid., pp. 134-135.

[26]Ibid.

[27]Gabriel A. Almond, The American People and Foreign Policy (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1950).

[28]James N. Rosenau, Public Opinion and Foreign Policy (New York: Random House, 1962).

[29]Bernard C. Cohen, Public's Impact on Foreign Policy (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1973).

[30]Charles W. Kegley, Jr., Eugene R. Wittkopf, American Foreign Policy: Pattern and Process, 2nd ed. (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1982) p. 250. Kegley and Wittkopf identify Henry Stimson, James F. Byrnes, Dean Acheson and Clark Clifford as members of an elite "establishment". All of these individuals had a role in the formulation of the Truman Doctrine.

IV

SYMBOLISM AND THE TRUMAN DOCTRINE

While the evidence that could clearly support claims that public opinion was manipulated in building consensus for the Greek-Turkish aid program can be found in the public and private documents of policy makers, it is important, primarily, to view the various arguments and circumstantial evidence which has been put forth as proof of such manipulation. Many of those who maintain that such manipulation could occur rest their arguments on the dramatic nature of the message delivered by the president on March 12th 1947[1]. Indeed, much of the literature on the notion of symbolism in politics argues that dramatic presentations of issues by leaders, such as the president with the symbolic force of his office, are a sure way to mobilize support. These arguments hold that certain types of language and their tone imply and suggest threats to the public, and that this is an effective means for galvanizing support. One way in which a threat can be implied and a public can be mobilized is by suggesting that a crisis exists and must be dealt with. It is argued that this is precisely what was done in the Truman Doctrine speech.

It has been argued that the language of the Truman Doctrine was intended to induce an emotional response from the public by implying a threat.[2] One clear example of this threat is the numerous references to the Greek situation as being a "Crisis".[3] A significant amount of research has been conducted regarding the notion of crisis in international politics. The potency of the symbol which the term generates is significant and the use of the term in this context is important in understanding the symbolic language of the Truman doctrine.

To begin with, crises are situations in which some type of unfavorable action is threatened or inflicted. In addition, crises are mostly unexpected events. That is, they are a surprise to the leaders. Beyond this, crises are events which call upon a threatened or inflicted population for concerted action,

> More powerfully, perhaps, than any other political term, it suggests a need for unity and common sacrifice....[It] justif[ies] the actions of leaders and the sacrifices leaders demand of others.[4]

Thus, the notion of crisis corresponds to the discussion by Edelman of symbols providing threats and assurances to the masses. Crisis sets the tone for any message which is to follow. In the case of the Truman Doctrine, the implication that the situation in Greece was a crisis left all further discussions, including requests for aid, to be viewed in

that light. The threat of the situation in Greece was established before Truman said a word about it.

The question arises at this point is whether the specific situation in Greece in 1946-47 could truly be categorized as a crisis. As noted earlier, a good deal of research has been conducted concerning the notion of crisis in international politics and much of that research centers on the classification of crisis situations. At least one study found nine different categories into which international situations fall.[5] Applying these criteria to the situations in Greece and Turkey during 1947 has led another author to conclude that these situations could have forgone the crisis labels.

Charles Hermann's study of international crisis was adopted by Michael Leigh in viewing the situations in Greece and Turkey during 1947.[6] Leigh found that these situations more closely resembled the lowest of Hermann's nine classifications: the "administrative situation" rather than the highest of the nine classifications: "crisis." The characteristics of the "administrative situation" are "low threat, short time, and anticipated [events]." According to Leigh, these were the characteristics of the situations in Greece and Turkey rather than a crisis, which is characterized by, "high threat, short time, and surprise."[7]

On the other hand, one would have a difficult task proving that government officials did not perceive the situations in Greece and Turkey as crises. Joseph Jones argues that a crisis existed in Greece and Turkey.[8] George Kennan,[9] Dean Acheson,[10] and President Truman,[11] have all referred to the Greek-Turkish situation in their memoirs as a crisis. And from a scholarly perspective on crisis, though not as rigorous as that of Hermann, O'Neal and Berle[12] argue that the historical data available suggest that a crisis did indeed exist at the time.

As noted in a previous section of this paper,

> The State Department Public Information offices recommended a program...in order to make the American people aware of the Greek crisis."[13]

Freeland argues that the Truman administration and the Truman Doctrine itself, "creat[ed] the crisis of March 1947."[14] Freeland further argues,

> ...it is difficult not to conclude that the crisis of March 1947 had its origins in American politics rather than developments in Greece."[15]

Whether the situations in Greece or Turkey were ever actually crises is questionable, but the notion that they should be labeled as such is very important to the manipulation theorists. Edelman, for instance, argues

> National crises, therefore, have their uses in shaping opinion....The twentieth century has seen economic, military, and social crises succeed one another, and the forseeable future will not be different.[16]

Regarding the labeling of crisis by governments, Edelman also notes,

> People who benefit from a crisis are easily able to explain it to themselves and to the mass public in terms that mask or minimize their own contributions and incentives while highlighting outside threats and unexpected occurrences. The divergence between the symbolic import of crises and their material impact is basic to their popular acceptance.[17]

The Greek situation being labeled a crisis when the objective evidence may not support such a label appears to correspond with Edelman's interpretation of such a classification. The language used to support the claim that the situations in Greece and Turkey were crises was also ambiguous. It is this language that will be the focus of this paper.

The manipulation theorists argue that, with the tone of the message being in the context of a crisis situation, the threat was implanted in the minds of the American press, Congress and public. It then became the task of the administration to nurture the threat with more ambiguous terminology that both added to the threat by appearing to explain the extent of the crisis, and reassuring the public as to the methods by which the administration was meeting the challenge of the threat. Edelman notes,

> Any regime that prides itself on crisis management is sure to find crises to manage, and crisis management is always available as a way to mobilize public support.[18]

The language used to nurture the notion of crisis contained the same emotive content that is discussed by Edelman in his work, The Symbolic Uses of Politics. These words or phrases can be termed as key symbols or slogans. Key symbols and slogans serve as emotional stimuli to an audience or public which, according to Edelman, tends to respond primarily based on their emotional rather than their logical faculties.

According to Harold Lasswell, key symbols and slogans,

> provid[e] a common experience for everyone in the state, ranging from the most powerful boss to the humblest layman or philosopher. Indeed, one of the few experiences that bind human beings together, irrespective of race, region, occupation, party or religion, is exposure to the same set of key words. Sentiments of loyalty cluster around these terms, and contribute to the loyalty of the commonwealth.[19]

Edelman argues that, in addition to having a sentimental appeal to the commonwealth, key symbols have the ability to stimulate perceptions of threat and assurance to the public audience, this of course, depending on the symbol used. The main characteristic of the symbols commonly used in the rhetoric of politics is the ambiguity attached to each term. It is this ambiguity which, many would suggest, allows the public to be seduced or enraged by the symbols employed by the administration.

Some symbols seem to emerge as ones which the administration emphasized when drafting the Truman Doctrine. This section of the paper will attempt to analyze the March 12, 1947 Presidential address for terms or phrases which could be considered symbolic, or could have been inserted to ensure public support. Perhaps the most obvious of the symbols employed by the Truman Doctrine is concept "democracy." The adjective "democratic" was questionable, to say the least, when applied to the Greek state of 1947.[20] Truman and his staff knew this fact, yet the speech contained three specific references made about the Greek state using some form of the word democratic prior to Truman's admonition of Greece for its "extremist measures."

Perhaps those who drafted the Truman Doctrine saw the value in using such terms. Edelman suggests that the term "democracy" is symbolic[21] in that it suggests to Americans that the government in question is legitimate and, in fact, conducts its internal affairs in the same way in which they are conducted in the United States. Thus, "democracy" appeals to the American Public, it is synonymous with the American perception of good government. It appeals to the myth of citizen participation which has been ingrained in the American belief system through a variety of cultural processes.

It could be argued that, by employing the term democracy and the emotional baggage which the term carries

with it, the Truman administration was casting the mold for the American public to perceive Greece as a friendly ally. Whether the administration was exaggerating the facts is a point of debate. It is clear, however, that the American public had little general knowledge of the situation within Greece and Turkey prior to the Truman Doctrine. This fact is evidenced by a poll taken in March of 1947, asking the American people questions about their knowledge of the political situations within Greece and Turkey, (see appendix, Table 4). In each case the percentage of the American public with "no opinion" or no knowledge of the internal political climates of Greece and Turkey was higher than those answering either yes or no. According to the manipulation theorists, the fact that the American public was not aware of the situation in Greece and Turkey, and for the most part, was not even aware of the types of governments in these countries, suggests that the language employed by the Truman Doctrine, especially the references to a "democratic" Greek state, was implanted to build the perception among the American public that Greece and Turkey were friendly allies and deserved United States assistance.

Numerous other symbols were employed by the drafters of the Truman Doctrine. A review of the text of the speech yields many terms which would fall into the categories established by Edelman and Lasswell. Among these other symbols to be found in the text of the Truman Doctrine

are those on the positive, or as noted by Lasswell, "indulgent" side, meaning those symbols which provide assurances; and on the other, "deprivation"[22] side we find terms to evoke negative emotions or threats, (see appendix, Table 5).

That the American public was virtually unaware of events in Greece and Turkey, or in most areas of the world at that time, is evidenced by passages and polls cited above. The arguments by Edelman, Lasswell and Bennett state that symbolic language serves as a cue for the uninformed voter. This type of language elicits a response, either positive or negative depending on the symbol employed, and this response dictates the attitude or opinions which a good deal of the public will have regarding the issue in question.

Authors such as Leigh, Freeland, Graber, Barnet, and Kolko argue that the language of the Truman Doctrine and the press coverage, both prior to and after this speech, was engineered by the administration, specifically the State, War, Navy Coordinating Committee, Undersecretary Acheson, Clark Clifford and various other individuals who advised the committee. Jones notes that prior to the announcement by Truman on March 12, 1947 a campaign was conducted by the members of the SWNCC and the State Department Public Information Office to persuade the members of the press of the need for the Greek aid. Acheson held background talks

with representatives of the press and radio broadcasters,[23] these talks were productive, "News and radio men collected and spread the pollen of information and speculation among Congressmen, government officials, and the public."[24] Jones further notes,

> If the government was reluctant to speak publicly of the decline in British power and to suggest that the time had come when any hope for peace and well-being in the world required that the United States step into the role formerly played by Great Britain, public commentators and editorial writers were not.[25]

Whether the public information campaigns and the background talks had any great effect on the outcome of the press and ultimately the public support for the Greek-Turkish aid is questionable at this point. Certainly, if the arguments of Edelman and others are valid, and the general public responds to symbolic language in an emotional way, then the members of the press are likely to respond in a similar fashion. The literature on the subject of press response to government information campaign is varied. At least one author maintains that the press tended to respond to "cues" furnished by the administration.[26] This notion of cues suggests that some type of semantic or psychological stimulus was presented by the administration that the press responded to and subsequently, relayed to the American public. It has been argued that the type of stimuli employed by the administration in the case of the Truman Doctrine were verbal and non-verbal symbols.

The above argument suggests that the press is often "used" by government officials to advance policy. While this argument is true in many respects, it is misleading to assume that the press is in collusion with the administration in an attempt to dupe the American public into accepting policy. For the most part, the press is reluctant to admit that they are ever "used by government officials."[27] Yet even when the press is being used they are doing their job. Bernard Cohen notes,

> If you have a policy, you have something that makes a good story for a reporter... The news agency may grumble and call it 'propaganda' but they dutifully report as 'hard news' most of what the State Department News Officer offers them by way of official Department statements at his noon briefings.[28]

Cohen argues that because the press is constrained by its neutrality in reporting foreign affairs, it

> more easily lends itself to the uses of others and particularly to public officials whom reporters have come to regard as prime sources of news merely by virtue of their positions in government.[29]

While these arguments seem to suggest that a confidence exists between press and government people, they do not necessarily suggest that the press will respond to the symbolic language in a way similar to the general public. Indeed, one would expect that most foreign affairs or administration reporters would be familiar enough with the ways of Washington that they would attempt to by-pass primary thought processes and view the aid proposals in their realistic meaning. While in some cases this

expectation is fulfilled, in many instances it is not. According to Cohen,

> Those who are concerned with [the] images of the world will note that the way the press goes about shaping the pattern of public information is not characterized by any orderly or systematic approach to the substance of foreign affairs, nor by any explicit understanding of what public information might usefully consist in.[30]

Thus, Cohen appears to be arguing that since the press is primarily unfamiliar with and unaware of the complexities of foreign affairs, as is the general public, they are in the same position to be affected by the emotional appeals and symbolic language of government officials. If this is so, and the arguments of Cohen and others are accepted, then this would seem to support arguments of those who maintain that government officials direct press and public response to political issues. However, while the evidence thus far presented might tend to support such assertions, another body of literature might tend to dispute them.

Some have suggested that the press serves as a restricting force on what is possible in the area of foreign affairs.[31] One study has even suggested that the press, specifically the printed media, performs an "agenda setting" function for the mass public.[32]

> The main media force attention to certain issues. They build up public images of political figures. They are constantly presenting objects suggesting what individuals in the mass should think about, know about, have feelings about.[33]

This latter body of literature would appear to contradict the information presented by Cohen which argues that elites and top government officials direct messages to individuals in the press who merely relay these messages to the public. A study with similar findings about the agenda setting function of the mass media concludes the following,

> We do not mean our results to be taken as an indication of political mischief at the networks. In deciding what to cover, editors and journalists are influenced most by organizational routines, internal power struggles, and commercial imperatives. This leaves little room for political motives.[34]

Such statements provide the student of foreign policy with a perplexing problem. It is difficult to accept the arguments that so-called political elites are in a position to manipulate the press, and there-by the mass public, when evidence suggests that the press is more directed by its own bureaucratic structure and desire to sell papers. Moreover, it is difficult to accept all of the claims made by those who argue that opinion is manipulated by symbolic language. Clearly, parts of their arguments make sense, but one remains skeptical. To rely, as do Leigh, Freeland, Barnett, Kolko and others, on the evidence presented is insufficient for one to conclude that elites manipulated opinion with the Truman Doctrine.

Perhaps evidence is available to resolve our problems. If an analysis of the press coverage during the weeks surrounding the March 12, 1948 announcement of the Truman Doctrine is conducted, one might observe similarities

between the language used by the press in its editorial comment and that of those so called elites to determine if there is any evidence of manipulation. In addition, by viewing the text of speeches, memoirs, public and private documents of these elites one might find positive evidence of plans for manipulation. If so, this might prove conclusively that it existed.

FOOTNOTES

[1]Richard M. Freeland, The Truman Doctrine and the Origins of McCarthyism: Foreign Policy, Domestic Relations and Internal Security, 1946-1948 (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1972) pp. 88-94; Joyce and Gabriel Kolko, The Limits of Power: The World and United States Foreign Policy, 1945-1954 (New York: Harper & Row Publishers, 1972) pp. 332-336.

[2]Micheal Leigh, Mobilizing Consent: Public Opinion and American Foreign Policy, 1937-1947 (Westport, Greenwood Press, 1976) p. 145; Freeland, The Truman Doctrine and the Origins of McCarthyism p. 89.

[3]The New York Times, 8 March 1947, p. 1; Freeland, The Truman Doctrine and the Origins of McCarthyism pp. 88-94.

[4]Murray Edelman, Political Language: Words that Succeed and Policies that Fail (New York: Academic Press, 1977) p. 45.

[5]Charles F. Hermann, ed., International Crisis: Insights from Behavioral Research (New York: Free Press, 1973) p. 13.

[6]Leigh, Mobilizing Consent p. 141.

[7]Hermann, International Crisis p. 13, cited in Ibid.

[8]Joseph M. Jones, The Fifteen Weeks (New York: The Viking Press, 1955) p. 133.

[9]George F. Kennan, Memoirs: 1925-1950 (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1967) p. 315.

[10]Dean Acheson, Present at the Creation: My Years in the State Department (New York: W.W. Norton and Company, Inc., 1969) p. 217.

[11]Harry S. Truman, Memoirs (Volume II): Years of Trial and Hope (Garden City, NY: Doubleday & Company, 1956) p. 99.

[12]John R. O'Neal, Foreign Policy Making in Times of Crisis (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1982) p. 137; Adolf A. Berle, Tides of Crisis: A Primer of Foreign Relations (New York: Reynal & Company, 1957) p. 63.

[13]William C. Mallalieu, "The Origins of the Marshall Plan", Political Science Quarterly 73 (December, 1958) p. 484.

[14]Freeland, The Truman Doctrine and the Origins of McCarthyism p. 93.

[15]Ibid., p. 93.

[16]Edelman, Political Language pp. 33-34.

[17]Ibid., p. 46.

[18]Ibid., p. 47.

[19]Harold D. Lasswell, Nathan Leites and Associates, Language of Politics: Studies in Quantitative Semantics (Cambridge: The M.I.T. Press, 1965) p. 13.

[20]Kolko, The Limits of Power p. 342; Leigh, Mobilizing Consent p. 146.

[21]Murray Edelman, The Symbolic Uses of Politics (Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1964) p. 19.

[22]Harold D. Lasswell, "The World Attention Survey", Public Opinion Quarterly 5 (1941) p. 456.

[23]Jones, The Fifteen Weeks, p. 163.

[24]Ibid.

[25]Ibid.

[26]Mallalieu, "The Origin of the Marshall Plan", p. 484.

[27]Bernard C. Cohen, The Press and Foreign Policy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963) p. 29.

[28]Ibid.

[29]Ibid., p. 28.

[30]Ibid., p. 175.

[31]Bernard C. Cohen, The Public's Impact on Foreign Policy (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1973) p. 112.

[32]Maxwell McCombs and Donald L. Shaw, "The Agenda Setting Function of the Mass Media", Public Opinion Quarterly 36 (1972) p. 176.

[33]Kurt Lang and Gladys Engel Lang, "The Mass Media and Voting", Bernard Berelson and Morris Janowitz, eds., Readers in Public Opinion and Communication (New York: Free Press, 1966) p. 466, cited in Ibid.

[34]Shanto Iyengar, Mark D. Peters, Donald R. Kinder, "Experimental Demonstrations of the Not-So-Minimal Consequences of Television News Programs", Doris Graber, ed., Media Power in Politics (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly Press, 1984) p. 58.

V

THE ROLE OF BELIEF SYSTEM

An analysis of the press coverage, primarily the editorial coverage, should provide evidence to support or deny that the use of symbolic language was instrumental in building a public consensus for the Greek-Turkish aid proposals. Past studies give an indication of what form this analysis should take. Harold Lasswell and others analyzed pre-war and wartime propaganda through the German and American press. Using content analysis Lasswell concluded that the appeal of emotional or symbolic language is quite forceful as a means of domestic propaganda for supporting foreign policies.[1] This is consistent with the works of Edelman and Bennett, but is directed more specifically to the area of foreign, rather than domestic policies.

Lasswell's analysis was extensive in its scope; reviewing countless volumes of periodicals and newspapers for many months, he identified and weighted specific words and phrases for their symbolic value and then coded the statistical data to record frequencies of usage of the terms.[2]

This study is intended to follow along a course similar to that of Lasswells, yet not in such an exhaustive manner. We may even find evidence and arguments to challenge those of Lasswell. If, as Bernard Cohen argues, in their zeal to persuade the American public to accept the administration's policy proposals, the opponents of public information programs often cross the "dividing line between education and propaganda,"[4] it seems important to determine whether this line was crossed in the campaign for the Truman Doctrine.

This study will observe editorial coverage of the events in Greece and Turkey during the interim two week period between the submission of the British notes regarding the ceasing of support for Greece and the announcement of the Truman Doctrine. Editorial coverage was chosen because one can observe quite clearly just what a columnist thinks about a specific issue, and this is often an indication of what the general public thinks. Moreover, through the language a columnist uses to describe the situation one can often find instances of symbolism. One might assume that if propaganda techniques being employed by the administration are being responded to by columnists, then in all probability there will be a similar response by the public. Most of the authors

on the subject of symbolism argued that symbols affect all levels of society in similar ways.

The sources of the editorial coverage were the New York Times and the Washington Post. These sources were chosen because they have consistently had a reputation as "prestige papers."[5] In other words, both papers regularly include virtually all the information regarding foreign affairs available to the press. Regarding the New York Times, Cohen notes,

> the Times is the newspaper of record....It is the source which is referred to by virtually everyone in government who has an interest or a responsibility in foreign affairs.[6]

In addition to the above factors, two of the sources for this paper have suggested that the reporters and columnists of the Times and Post were the individuals to whom the administration primarily targeted their information campaign. Jones suggests this in his text as does Cornwell.[7] Jones goes as far as to name some of the columnists working for the Times or the Post with whom government people regularly keep in contact in order to cultivate a confidential relationship.[8]

The Washington Post and the New York Times both presented a relatively favorable treatment of the aid program in the initial weeks. In viewing the editorial comment one sees this in both the editorial staff and the columnists of both papers. Overall, commentary appeared favorable and supportive. If one concentrates on observing

these editorials for instances of symbolic or emotional language, one can find examples of their usage. If we recall that symbolic language is that which elicits an emotional response from the audience, either a threat or an assurance, then it merely becomes the task of the analyst to read the commentary to determine whether the language used could be judged as emotional. Indeed, the works by Lasswell and others suggest a variety of words and phrases which fall into the category of symbolic language. Often symbolic language, it should be remembered, is emotional without being very specific. The ambiguity of this language is what makes it so effective in persuading people towards a specific course of action.

Beginning with the Washington Post, from the day after the British submitted the notes to the State Department concerning Greece and Turkey, the editorial comment of the Post appeared favorable to such a program. Much of the reportage included terms and phrases which could be considered consistent with the criteria established by Lasswell, Edelman, Bennett and others for symbolic language. In the March 1, 1947 issue an editorial appeared titled World Crisis in which the following sentence held a prominent location,

> A statesman thinks of the next generation not the next election and there will be no next generation if we do not grapple with our world responsibilities.[9]

Clearly the threat implied by this sentence is obvious, however, in the sentence as well as in the column, the threat is never fully explained but is left relatively ambiguous. We know that we should fear the Communists and that we will have to face up to them but what is never specifically explained is why.

On March 3, an editorial by Joseph Alsop employed the following passages,

> In the past weeks the optimistic foundation of American world policy has quite literally been shattered by a series of hammer blows, President Truman has to decide what to do about it.... The Greek situation began to deteriorate. The rising Greek crisis imposed demands which the British government lacked resources to meet.... The security of Turkey depends on Greece.... The facts of the world situation, so they say, urgently require broad scale action. The best approach, therefore, is to base the appeal to Congress on the real issue. This, the American people will understand.[10]

The threats in the preceding passages by Alsop are apparent as is the reassurance that swift American action and resolve by the American people can halt the deterioration of American security throughout the world, and this swift action will come about by a clear presentation of the facts to the American public. What also is suggested in the preceding passages is the fact that Alsop might be getting his information from some source within the administration. This is evident by the statement made by Alsop regarding a need for action. Alsop states in the middle of the sentence, "so they say." Apparently, "they" could be someone in the administration explaining to Alsop

in somewhat dramatic terms the course American policy must take.

Other columns in the Post during that week carried a similar message and the points were made using similar language. On March 4, in a column by Mark Sullivan titled "U.S. Must Assume World Leadership," the following passage was printed.

> The hour is here when the United States must announce that it accepts its own destiny as the chief world power. We must fulfill the demands of that position, no matter what it costs if we eventually, along with other people, are to survive as free men.[11]

In a column, in the March 9 issue of the Post titled "A Test Case in Greece," Andre Visson called the Middle East, referring to Greece and Turkey, the "worlds number 1 powderkeg" and argued, "it is a great responsibility, but we must assume it, for the alternative would be further Soviet expansion."[12]

Also in the March 9 issue of the Post columnist Marquis Childs penned the following,

> Disorder and anarchy threaten in large areas of the earth. Greece is a small example of a mere pinpoint on the tapestry that shows the apocalyptic horsemen on the not too distant horizon.[13] (emphasis added)

On March 10 in an editorial by Barnett Nover, titled "New Policy for a Troubled Age," the following passages were cited,

> It is not enough to supply aid to Greece, we should strengthen the truly democratic forces in that Balkan Kingdom....If we fail in Greece either by default or incompetence our troubles will multiply.[14] (emphasis added)

And on March 12, the day of the President's announcement, the Post printed the following editorial comments.

> The United States is the enemy of aggression - the sworn enemy by reason of her commitments under the United Nations, the natural enemy by reason of her power. President Truman will presumably make this idea today.[15] (emphasis added)

Sumner Welles in his article titled "Democratic World Looks to U.S." printed the following, "the chestnuts are American as well as British." Welles also states:

> The issue could not be plainer, if the United States acquieses to the extension of Soviet domination over Greece, Turkey will soon therafter come within the Soviet orbit. The Levant, the Arab States and North Africa will then lie open to Soviet expansion.[16] (emphasis added)

The preceeding passages suggest a variety of things about the use of symbolic language by the Press. From the discussion of a new "destiny" for the United States in the World by Mark Sullivan and Andre Visson to the threatening forecasts and biblical allusions of Sumner Welles and Marquis Childs. Also included in the columns were numerous references to democracy, freedom, security, peace, etc. but seldom any specific mention of what the true threat might have been, the references were always clouded by the often dramatic yet seldom clear language of political rhetoric. Only occasionally was any reference made to the possibility that a U.S. response in Greece and Turkey was necessitated by a vacuum in the balance of power.

The case of the New York Times is similar to that of the Washington Post. Hanson W. Baldwin, for example, writing in the March 2 issue of the New York Times in an article favored a "world role" for the U.S. He also noted that it was important that the U.S. must "avert the decline of the Western civilization, and a reversion to nihilism and the dark ages." He attributed this decline to the "aggressive and expanding power if the Soviet Union."[17] On March 3, the Times editorial staff printed the following:

> Truman's request for $350,000,000...to back up Greece and keep the key citadel of the eastern Mediterranean and the whole Middle East from being inundated by the Russian tide.[18] (emphasis added)

On March 5, columnist James Reston printed the following regarding the situation in Greece,

> it is not a conflict between left and right but between those who believe in civil rights and those who do not.[19]

On March 9, Reston stated "the communist menace to an unsupported Greece is real."[20] On March 12 Reston stated "The danger of a communist flood is apparent."[21] And finally, on the day that Truman was to make his announcement to Congress, the Times staff printed the following:

> (The United States) will ring down the curtain on an epoch in America's foreign policy and begin a new chapter....The United States has taken its position in the front ranks among nations determined to check the further expansion of Russian domination and to strengthen the frontiers of Western freedom.[22]

Again in the preceding passages from the Times one sees the utilization of symbolic or highly emotive language in reference to the Greek situation. From Baldwin's fears of the "decline of the Western civilization and a reversion to the nihilism of the dark ages" to Reston's "inundation by the Russian tide" one can see examples of overly dramatic explanations of events. If one carefully views events in Greece and Turkey from the objective historical accounts of what happened, one begins to see a picture appear that is neither extremely threatening nor suggestive of an imminent crisis.[23] What appeared to be occurring were civil wars in states which had corrupt governments. Those trying to overthrow the governments in these states-primarily disaffected members of the military and political parties[24]-were receiving support from the Soviets. The threat of a "Russian tide" is hardly implied by this. Most authors, including George Kennan, the architect of containment policy, have maintained that the threats were not as great as they were made out to be. Kennan notes that he and others in the State Department saw the threat as being more political than military.[25] Indeed the research by Charles Hermann indicates that the threat was neither high nor imminent. One must ask then, why were the presentations in the press so dramatic.

Perhaps it would have been more appropriate for the columnists to discuss the situations in their realistic or

power politics context. Two states emerging from a world war more powerful than any other states on the planet would naturally be threatened by each other because of their capabilities for achieving their competing interests. The vacuum left in the balance after the axis powers had been defeated and England had been devastated thrust both the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. into positions which had traditionally been held by the large European states in balancing and preventing countervailing power to prevent the other side from aggression.[26] It is precisely this type of activity which George Kennan argued in his long telegram from Moscow,[27] and the famous "X"[28] article. He viewed the activities of the Soviet Union in terms of power politics, not solely of ideological opposition between East and West. Yet with minor exceptions as seen earlier, much of the justifications for aid by columnists was in ideological terms. Some evidence suggests that a presentation of the facts in terms of power politics might not have been successful. John Spanier has noted that in the immediate period following World War II there existed an attitude among the American people that things should return to normal.

> The United States had historically drawn a clear-cut distinction between war and peace in its approach to foreign policy. Peace was characterized by a state of harmony among nations; power politics, on the other hand, was considered abnormal and war a crime. In peacetime, one needed to pay little or no attention to foreign problems; indeed to do so would have diverted

> men from their individual, materialistic concerns and upset the whole scale of social values. The effect of this attitude was clear: Americans turned their attention toward the outside world with reluctance and usually only when they felt provoked--that is when the foreign menace had become so clear that it could no longer be ignored.[29]

This isolationist attitude was also prevalent among many members of Congress and it was this sentiment which most of the authors who wrote about the Truman Doctrine said needed to be overcome.[30] When the success of Acheson's dramatic presentation to congressional leaders was seen, it was decided that a similar presentation should be made to the American press and public. Thus, a presentation was devised and delivered to the public on March 12, 1947 which requested large amounts of aid and assistance, and employed numerous terms and phrases which could be considered symbolic.[31] The question remains: to what extent were so called elites within the administration manipulating opinion through the deliberate use of imprecise language to confuse the public and elicit a response arrived at through a primary or emotional thought process. In addition, if administration elites were indeed manipulating opinion, when and how did they cross the dividing line between education and propaganda.

These seem to be important questions which to this point have been unanswered by the evidence presented. Perhaps some answers can be found in the biographies and

autobiographies of those individuals most influential in the decision making process.

If one is to prove that manipulation of opinion through the deliberate use of emotional rhetoric existed, one need also prove that those doing the manipulating fully understood the situations in a rational way and fully understood the uses of symbolism and propaganda in the context of mass persuasion. If deliberate intent cannot be proven then one has merely made a case for education, not manipulation. In other words, if evidence suggests that the officials responsible for devising the wording of the Truman Doctrine actually perceived the threat in ideological terms and crisis fear then it would be difficult to suggest that they were deliberately manipulating opinion. Their activities of mobilizing support would probably fall into the category of education, or to use Berry's term, "teaching" the public.

To begin with, the memoirs of President Truman shed some light onto the preceptions of the individual most prominent in the decision making process.[32]

When reading President Truman's memoirs, especially regarding the era of the Cold War and the Truman Doctrine, one is immediately struck by the highly emotional and ideologically symbolic terms with which Truman apparently perceived the Greek and Turkish situations.

> The ideas and traditions of our nation demanded that we come to the aid of Greece and Turkey and that we put the world on notice that it would be our policy to support the cause of freedom whenever it was threatened.[33]

This type of language in reference to the situations in Greece and Turkey is consistent with the notion that key symbols and slogans have a similar appeal to society as a whole. Lasswell, Edelman and Bennett all argue that cultural processes direct the way in which these individuals respond to symbolic messages or cues. One can, therefore, presume that these cultural processes will affect the way in which individuals will perceive domestic and international affairs. Henry Kissinger argues,

> It is part of our folklore that, while other nations have interests we have responsibilities; while other nations are concerned with equilibrium, we are concerned with the legal requirements of peace.[34]

Thus it is quite possible, and indeed highly likely based on a reading of his memoirs, that President Truman genuinely perceived events in Greece and Turkey as crises, assaults on freedom, and a clash between democracy and communism, rather than solely as threats to the power interests of the United States. Some have argued that this was precisely the case and that Truman's perceptions of Soviet conflict were primarily effected by the opinions of James Forrestal, George Kennan and Dean Acheson.[35] Truman argues,

> What course the free world should take in the face of the threat of Russian Totalitarianism was a subject I had discussed with my foreign policy advisers on many occasions in the years just past....The studies which Marshall and Acheson brought to me and which we examined together made it plain that serious risks would be involved. But the alternative would be disastrous to our security and to the security of free nations everywhere.[36]

It is, therefore, quite possible that Blanchard is correct, and Truman's perceptions were indeed affected by the influence of his advisers. James Forrestal, for example makes quite a few references to discussions he had with the President and cabinet members, where Greece and Turkey were the topic.[37] Arthur Rogow, who wrote Forrestal's biography called Forrestal an "ardent anti-communist" and points out that it was Forrestal who seized onto Kennan's reports as evidence that Soviet ideology was the main threat to international peace.[38] One can find numerous references to Forrestal's opinions of communism when reading his memoirs. LaFebre notes that Forrestal sent Truman a "highly emotional memorandum" on March 7, 1947. His note suggested that the threat in Greece and Turkey equalled that of World War II.

Acheson, as well appears to affirm that his perception of the Greek-Turkish situations was one of a communist threat primarily based on a conflict of ideologies, not a power struggle for political influence and allies. Acheson notes,

> Only slowly did it dawn upon us that the whole world structure and order that we had inherited from the nineteenth century was gone and that the struggle to replace it would be directed from two bitterly opposed and ideologically irreconcilable power centers.[39]

These statements indicate that Acheson was aware of the fact that while balance of power concerns were important, it was primarily a conflict of ideologies. Lloyd Gardiner appears to agree with this assessment of Acheson's views.

> The real issue, wrote Louis Halle, one of Acheson's associates in the State Department at the time of the Truman Doctrine, was the balance of power: "As in 1917, as in 1941, it was still not possible to tell the American people what the real issue was." Halle's effort to put the cold war into a "realistic" mold might do justice to Machiavelli, but not to the convictions of Dean Acheson.[40]

Much evidence, therefore seems to suggest that Acheson genuinely perceived the conflict in the terms in which he annunciated to his associates and superiors. McLellan notes about Acheson

> ...his convictions about individual freedom were salient and vital and not simply an ideological mask for economic and elite interests.[41]

While no evidence could be found to refute the argument that Acheson genuinely "understood" the Greek-Turkish situation in the same way he described it, evidence does exist that suggest he was aware of the uses of symbolic language as a form of political control. In a 1946 speech to the Harvard Club Acheson acknowledged that "propaganda, which uses familiar and respected words and ideas to implant images,"

is a standard practice among states for inducing behavior. This practice included something which Acheson called the "new psychology of crisis."[42]

Although this does not imply that propaganda or symbolic language was deliberately used to induce behavior in the case of Acheson's presentations and drafting the speech, it does indicate that he could have knowingly done so. McLellan notes about Acheson's "dramatic" presentation to Congressional leaders, "what Acheson had to say was said with the deliberate intention of stimulating his listeners."[43]

While certain evidence exists on both sides of the coin regarding Acheson's intentions, it would appear that the bulk of the evidence would tend to indicate that Acheson genuinely perceived the Greek-Turkish situations in crisis terms and as an ideological conflict between the United States representing freedom, and the Soviet Union representing totalitarianism.

As for George Kennan, the reverse seems to be the case. The Kennan memorandum sent from Moscow to Washington in February of 1946 has been seen by many as the primary motivation and justification being the policies undertaken by the United States regarding the Soviet Union in the post-war era. Kennan's telegram outlined his own perceptions of the Soviet threat. This document consisted of five separate parts each covering a specific aspect of

Soviet-American relations. Much of Kennan's analysis of the conflict between the two states appeared to be centered on the ideological clash between communism and capitalism; the discussion ranged from viewing Soviet propaganda statements and party line to offering suggestions for U.S. policies vis a vis the Soviets. However, references to the seeking and maintenance of power and alliances by both states are abundant in the memo. This indicates that Kennan perceived that the true nature of the conflict might indeed be a balancing of power between the two sides. Regarding possible activities of the Soviet state which must be watched, Kennan notes,

> Internal policies devoted to increasing in every way strength and prestige of the Soviet state; intensive military industrialization; maximum development of armed forces; great displays to impress outsides; continual secretiveness about internal matters, designed to conceal weaknesses and keep opponents in the dark.[44]

Regarding the directions the United States should take in response to these Soviet activities, Kennan notes:

> [Soviet power is] impervious to logic of reason, and it is highly sensitive to logic of force. For this reason it can easily withdraw-and usually does-when strong resistance is encountered at any point. This if the adversary has sufficient force and makes clear his readiness to use it, he solely has to do so. If situations are properly handled there need be no prestige-engaging showdowns....Gauged against Western world as a whole, Soviets are still by far the weaker force. Thus, their success will really depend on degree of cohesion, firmness, and vigor which Western world can muster. And this is factor which it is within our power to influence.[45]

Clearly, what Kennan is describing in these two excerpts from his telegram is a classic power confrontation between the two central actors in the balance. The terminology used by Kennan-defining relations among states, and interests of states in terms of power, and discussions of gaining and maintaining alliances-is consistent with the realist school of international politics. The inference is that Kennan must have understood that the U.S.-Soviet conflict was not merely a clash between ideologies but a clash between the most powerful and predominant actors in international politics. However, if one continues to read the Kennan telegram, it becomes apparent that Kennan would occasionally use ideological or emotional terms to describe the conflict. "World communism is like malignant parasite which feeds only on diseased tissue."[46]

> In foreign countries Communists will, as a rule, work toward destruction of all forms of personal independence; economic, political or moral."[47]

Indeed, in his memoirs Kennan argues regarding the Moscow telegram,

> I read it over today with a horrified amusement. Much of it reads exactly like one of those primers put out by alarmed Congressional committees or by the Daughters of the American Revolution, designed to arouse the citizenry to the threat of the Communist conspiracy.[48]

So it appears quite possible that Kennan, as well as Acheson, Truman and Forrestal "understood" the situation in Greece, at the time, in the emotional terms in which it was presented to the American public. While it is also possible

that after the fact, they might have come to understand the events in the context of power politics, it is, perhaps, more likely, that in the initial stages of the conflict they understood it in the same type of black and white, good versus bad type of terms in which our culture tends to view things. Kennan notes in his memoirs that he later regretted the language of the Truman Doctrine, because

> We would find it necessary to give aid, over the ensuing years, to a number of regimes which would hardly qualify for it on the basis of their democratic character.[49]

While this passage clearly reflects Kennan's awareness of the non-ideological necessities of power politics alliances, it must be remembered that it was written many years after the Truman Doctrine. Morganthau notes,

> The actor on the political scene cannot help "playing an act" by concealing the true nature of his political actions behind the mask of a political ideology. The more removed the individual is from a particular power struggle, the more likely he is to understand its true nature.[50]

Thus, while as an author, in later years, Kennan might have clearly or realistically understood the situation, in his years as an actor in the policy process, he might have genuinely perceived the Greek-Turkish situation in emotional crisis terms. Kennan's analysis of Soviet intentions however, and his proposals for United States policy regarding the Soviets has been classified as being a realist or "particularist"[51] position; but, it has also been argued that Kennan perceived ideology to be an important element because the Soviets had been using the ideology of communism

as "an instrument with which to project influence beyond Russian borders."[52] It is thus difficult to accurately assess what position Kennan genuinely had regarding the events of 1946-1947, but it does appear that the possibility exists that Kennan might have perceived the situation in ideological terms. Certainly his report served as the foundation for the decision makers understanding, of the situation, and the preceeding pages have indicated that they appeared to understand the situation in an "idealist" rather than a strictly "realist" perspective.

In addition to Kennan's memorandum and subsequent article in Foreign Affairs,[53] it has been argued that other documents played an important role in determining the United States policy of containing the Soviets.[54] While these documents probably served to formulate the goals of containment, they also might have provided policy makers with the means for achieving them.

Language similar to that in the Kennan memorandum can be found in the "Top Secret" communications sent to President Truman by his advisors. The first of these documents, sent to the President on September 24, 1946, was drafted by special counsel to the President, Clark Clifford,

> after consultations with the Secretaries of State, War, Navy, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Attorney General, the Director of Central Intelligence and other administration officials.[55]

The document essentially was an attempt to formulate a coherent policy for the United States regarding the Soviet Union and tended to adopt the view of the Soviets put forth by Kennan in his telegram. Indeed much of what Clifford called for in his proposals paralleled those put forth by Kennan.

The language of the Clifford memorandum, like the Kennan memorandum, tended to highlight ideological differences between the Soviets and the United States as being one of the major sources of the dispute. Clifford argues that the security of the United States, the Soviet Union,

> and the rest of the World as well, is being jeopardized by aggressive military imperialism much as that in which the Soviet Union is now engaged.[56]

Clifford also refers to the need for the United States to "support and assist all democratic countries which are in any way menaced by the Soviet Union;"[57] he also suggested that

> the United States has no aggressive intentions and that the nature of our society is such that peaceful coexistence of capitalistic and communistic states is possible.[58]

In addition to this type of emotional language, however, one notices many passages which imply that Clifford and his contributors were aware of the conflict in its power politics context. For example,

> The language of military power is the only language which disciples of power politics understand. The United States must use that language in order that Soviet leaders will realize that our government is determined to uphold the intersts of its citizens and the rights of small nations.[59]

Other passages indicate that Clifford and his co-authors were aware of the uses of propaganda and symbolic language as a means of public persuasion.

> The United States should realize that Soviet propaganda is dangerous (especially when American "imperialism" is emphasized) and should avoid any actions which give an appearance of truth to Soviet charges.[60]

Again, one is left without a clear picture of what was the perception of those individuals in the information relaying roles. While it might appear, from their rhetoric that ideology played the primary role in their policies regarding the Soviets, it appears that power concerns were also given consideration by those formulating these policies.

One last document is argued as having been of primary importance in contributing to the knowledge and perceptions of those formulating the policies regarding the Soviets, and the aid policies regarding other countries.[61]

This document, issued by the joint chiefs of staff, maintained that certain areas had higher priorities for aid and assistance, based on their "importance to the national security of the United States."[62] Seemingly stressing power politics considerations as the motivation for policy, the document makes numerous references to "the event of

war with our ideological enemies"; suggesting that a motivation for a policy of containment, achieved by means of foreign assistance, might indeed be idealistic as well as realistic or strategic. This type of emotional and calculated rhetoric is repeated throughout the document, and in the context of whether policy makes had specific notions of what motivated their decisions is primarily confusing. If, as many manipulation theorists have argued, policy makes indeed perceived power politics considerations as the primary motivation behind their decisions to supply aid to countries, then emphasizing ideological differences between states or opponents should have been used primarily as the means for marshalling public support. It would not be likely that these ideological statements would show up in the private papers of policy makers if they were merely employed for their symbolic value. Indeed, one might expect to find some mention of any attempted manipulation, or at least, statements which would imply such manipulation. But these statemetns were not to be found in this research.

FOOTNOTES

[1]Harold Lasswell, Nathan Leites and Associates, Languages of Politics: Studies in Quantitative Semantics (Cambridge: The M.I.T. Press, 1965) p. 17.

[2]Cf. Ibid., pp. 55-145.

[3]Ibid., p. 113.

[4]Bernard C. Cohen, The Public's Impact on Foreign Policy (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1973) p. 171.

[5]Bernard C. Cohen, The Press and Foreign Policy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963) p. 109; also labeled "quality media" in James Rosenau, Public Opinion and Foreign Policy (New York: Random House, 1962) pp. 81-83.

[6]Cohen, The Press and Foreign Policy p. 39.

[7]Joseph M. Jones, The Fifteen Weeks (New York: The Viking Press, 1955) pp. 237-238; Elmer E. Cornwell, Presidential Leadership of Public Opinion (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1966) p. 165.

[8]Jones, The Fifteen Weeks p. 233.

[9]Washington (D.C.) Post, 1 March 1947, p. 8.

[10]Washington (D.C.) Post, 3 March 1947, p. 3.

[11]Washington (D.C.) Post, 4 March 1947, p. 11.

[12]Washington (D.C.) Post, 9 March 1947, Sec. 4B, p. 9.

[13]Ibid.

[14]Washington (D.C.) Post, 10 March 1947, p. 9.

[15]Washington (D.C.) Post, 12 March 1947, p. 12.

[16]Ibid.

[17]The New York Times, 2 March 1947, Sec. 1, p. 4.

[18]The New York Times, 3 March 1947, p. 20.

[19]The New York Times, 5 March 1947, p. 19.

[20]The New York Times, 9 March 1947, Sec. 4, p. 3.

[21]The New York Times, 12 March 1947, p. 4.

[22]Ibid., p. 24.

[23]Labeled "imminent crisis" by Acheson, cited by Jones, The Fifteen Weeks p. 195.

[24]David S. McLellan, Dean Acheson: The State Department Years (New York: Dodd, Mead and Company, 1976) p. 109.

[25]George F. Kennan, Memoirs: 1925-1950 (Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1967) p. 317.

[26]Hans J. Morganthau, In Defense of the National Interest (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1951) p. 115.

[27]Thomas H. Etzold and John Lewis Gaddis, Containment: Documents on American Policy and Strategy, 1945-1950 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1978) pp. 55-63.

[28]Ibid., pp. 84-89.

[29]John Spanier, American Foreign Policy Since World War II (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1980) p. 9.

[30]Richard M. Freeland, The Truman Doctrine and the Origins of McCarthyism: Foreign Policy, Domestic Relations and Internal Security, 1946-1948 (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1972) pp. 93-95.

[31]See Index, Tables 6 and 7.

[32]Harry S. Truman, Memoirs (Volume II): Years of Trial and Hope (Garden City, NY: Doubleday and Company, 1956) p. 103. Truman makes it quite clear that the decision to provide aid to Greece and Turkey was his.

[33]Ibid., p. 105.

[34]Henry A. Kissinger, "Central Issues of American Foreign Policy", Agenda for the Nation (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1968) pp. 610-611.

[35]Truman, Memoirs (Volume II) pp. 97-107.

[36]Ibid., p. 107.

[37]James Forrestal, Walter Millis, ed., The Forrestal Diaries (New York: The Viking Press, 1951) pp. 247-262.

[38]Aurthur Rogow, James Forrestal (New York: MacMillan and Company, 1963) pp. 126-129.

[39]Dean Acheson, Present at the Creation: My Years in the State Department (New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 1969) p. 726.

[40]Lloyd C. Gardner, Architects of Illusion: Men and Ideas in American Foreign Policy, 1941-1949 (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1970) p. 202.

[41]McLellan, Dear Acheson pp. 116-117.

[42]Dean Acheson, Fragments of My Fleece (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., Inc., 1971) pp. 20-21.

[43]McLellan, Dean Acheson p. 116.

[44]Kennan, Memoirs p. 552.

[45]Ibid., pp. 557-558.

[46]Ibid., p. 559.

[47]Ibid., p. 556.

[48]Ibid., p. 294.

[49]Ibid., p. 321.

[50]Hans J. Morganthau, Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace, 4th ed., (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1967) p. 84.

[51]William H. Blanchard, Aggression American Style (Santa Monica: Goodyear Publishing Company, Inc., 1978) p. 13.

[52]Kennan, Memoirs p. 557.

[53]Mr. X, "The Sources of Soviet Conduct", Foreign Affairs XXV (July, 1947) pp. 572-576, 580-582, cited in Ibid., p. 354.

[54]Etzold and Gaddis, Containment p. 49.

[55]Ibid., pp. 64-70.

[56]Ibid., p. 64.

[57]Ibid., p. 67.

[58]Ibid., p. 68.

[59]Ibid., p. 66.

[60]Ibid., p. 68.

[61]Ibid., p. 49.

[62]Ibid., pp. 71-84.

CONCLUSIONS

The central question of this paper has essentially been is there sufficient evidence available to justify claims of "manipulation of opinion" of the American public with the announcement of the Truman Doctrine, or does it appear that what occurred could have been, more appropriately, termed an informational or educational campaign? In other words, were the tone and the rhetoric of the President's message strategically designed to elicit a response from an apathetic public and a hesitant congress, and, if so, was there some purpose other than idealism which motivated American actions regarding the supplying of aid?

While there is certainly some evidence that the administration tended to employ rather dramatic, if not indeed symbolic, language in presenting the issue, there appears to be no solid proof to lead one to conclude that any "manipulation" occurred. One might even conclude that evidence appears to indicate that those so-called elites who formulated the containment policy and the means used to achieve it genuinely understood the situation, in its initial stages, in the same terms which they employed in their public rhetoric, implying that they were not being deceptive when presenting issues to the public.

The evidence compiled by reviewing the autobiographies and biographies of the main actors, and the official government documents of the period appears to indicate that those elites in the policy process had perceptions of the issues which framed them as questions of morality and ideology more so than questions of national interest defined in terms of acquiring power or economic gain. For the most part, it appears that Truman, Acheson, Kennan, Jones and other members of the administration described in memoirs and to friends their perceptions of the Greek-Turkish situation in the same way in which the situation was presented to the public on March 12, 1947. It is therefore, unlikely that a conspiracy to deceive the American public and attain support by deliberately manipulating information and language was carried out; or at least, it is unlikely that such a conspiracy could be clearly shown.

While it is certainly possible that these individuals carried on deception when they wrote their memoirs, this is probably not the case. To begin with, memoirs are generally accepted as accurate representations of an individuals perceptions of issues. Moreover, if it was manipulation, one must assume a vast amount of knowledge or awareness about the public on the part of the administration that just didn't appear to exist.

The newspaper coverage of the period is also important to this story. The language used by the press, which

was prominent in the weeks prior to the announcement of the Truman Doctrine is quite similar in its tone to that employed by Truman in his public rhetoric. It was often emotionally laden and it employed numerous references to crisis, threats, democracy, freedom, Communism and other terms and phrases which arguably could fall within the parameters of symbolic language.

It is possible to infer a number of things about the press coverage. For instance, one might assume, as would Cohen[1] that the language was similar because press people are ready to accept all the information that government officials relate to the press, be it propaganda or not. Since many historians of this period have pointed out that both official[2] and unofficial[3] actors seemed to supply information to the press during this period many have suggested that the press was essentially led along the propaganda path.

Still another scenario would have the press leading the administration in its perceptions of the issues.[4] Since the press coverage preceded most of the public rhetoric on the issue, it is possible that this coverage colored the administration's thinking on the issue. Most would contend, however, that officials in a government are not often affected by perceptions of issues held among the press and the public. In most cases, government officials form their perceptions of events and issues in foreign policy from

a variety of influences, perhaps the least important being the press and the public.[5]

Finally, a third inference one might gain by an examination of the press coverage, and indeed the public and private comments of the central actors in the formulation of the Truman Doctrine, is that one of the key variables which affects perceptions, anyone's perceptions, about issues of foreign relations, is that of a belief system. The best information available to decision makers and press people, must first filter through their belief system to be understood. This belief system then, certainly colors any understanding of an issue, and this directs the way in which individuals phrase their perception of issues when attempting to relay this information to others or educate them.

The fact that there was a similarity in rhetoric between the press and the decision making elites within the administration suggests that a common belief system exists in the United States which affects even the most rational thinking and cynical levels of our society. And, perhaps, this belief system is what Bennett, Edelman, and Lasswell refer to when they discuss the notion of cultural processes and myths affecting the way Americans understand politics and direct the way they respond to political language. Taken one step further, however, one might presume that these cultural processes and myths also effect the way in which decision makers genuinely understand the issues and this would

certainly direct their rhetoric. Again we are back to the question of whether officials in the government are aware of the facility with which opinion can be manipulated and, therefore, make calculated attempts to do so. Both Edelman and Lasswell appear to be clear on this point; Edelman argues that in general American politics is consistently full of examples of administration elites using language which is not necessarily consistent with their actual beliefs, as a method for political control and public support.[6] Lasswell, specifically referring to the use of language as propaganda in foreign affairs, concurs.[7] Bennett, however is not as clear on this point. He often suggests that cultural processes and belief systems are consistent at all levels of society;[8] implying that it is quite possible that decision makers impart information to the public after that information has already been filtered through their own belief system. The public then responds because the decision makers belief system is consistent with their own.

This notion of belief system or perception is very important as a variable in foreign policy analysis. Both Joseph deRivera[9] and Gerald Hopple[10] have put a great emphasis on this variable as affecting foreign policy decisions. Also Michael Sullivan argues that individual images and perceptions should be considered "a crucial independent agent accounting for individual behavior."[11] Kegley and Wittkopf refer to something called the "law of

anticipated reactions"[12] which hypothesizes that because

> there is every reason to believe that they embrace the basic value assumptions of American society... decision maker screen out certain alternatives because of their anticipation that the options would be adversely received, an anticipation born of the American value tradition which they share.[13]

This "law of anticipated reactions" essentially in the focus of the analysis of this paper. Did administration officials accurately and consciously determine beforehand that there would be certain factors limiting the ways in which the policy could be presented for approval, thus opting to employ a distorted presentation of events. Or did they genuinely them to the public.

Keyley and Wittkopf consider that this latter point is likely.

> In fact, decision makers may not even be conscious of the way in which political culture helps to define in their minds the range of permissable policy.[14]

Daniel J. Elazar concurs, noting that, political culture often places limits or constraints on individuals in the policy making process, and these limits are so effective because, "those limited are unaware of the limitations placed upon them."[15]

That individual decision making could be swayed by their belief system or ideology in policy formulation is consistent with the arguments of Hans Morganthau. As noted earlier in this essay, Morganthau maintained that ideology plays a role in the making of foreign policy.

> While all politics is necessarily pursuit of power, ideologies render involvement in that contest for power psychologically and morally acceptable to the actors and their audience.[16]

But Morganthau also notes,

> the deeper the individual is involved in the power struggle, the less likely he is to see the power struggle for what it is.[17]

Hence, decision makers, even those individuals who are attempting to employ an extremely rational thought process, are subject to their unconscious belief system. The information that is given to high leveled decision makers must pass through a series of ideological filters before policy is formulated. These filters include the various perceptions and images which the decision makers have of this information. These perceptions would invariably be conditioned by the decision makers values and beliefs. His values and beliefs would, in turn, be conditioned by societal values and beliefs which have been passed onto the individual through such means as myth, folklore, the educational system and family. Beyond the effect that belief system has on high level decision makers, is the effect that belief system has on the lower level information gatherers and disseminators. Certainly, their own values and beliefs would condition their own perceptions of information and, thus, would effect their interpretations of that information when relaying it to superiors. One would of course, expect that lower level decision makers would be

subjected to the same societal values and cultural processes that higher level decision makers are subjected to.

It is tremendously important, therefore, to consider image or belief system as an intervening or a conditioning variable when analyzing foreign policy formulation. The aid policies of the Truman Doctrine are one example where belief system apparently played a large role in the formulation of policy. The ideological beliefs of the decision makers, if not directly formulating the perceptions of the decision makers, were certainly important as a conditioning variable in the formulation of the decision. This being the case, it is difficult to conclude that manipulation occurred or that propaganda was used. As noted by Cohen, there is a fine "dividing line between education and propaganda" and it is difficult to determine at what point this line is crossed. In the case of the Truman Doctrine, however, it appears that the informational campaign and the rhetoric fell more on the side of education than propaganda. Hence, it is hard to substantiate the manipulation thesis.

FOOTNOTES

[1]Bernard C. Cohen, The Press and Foreign Policy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963) p. 31.

[2]Elmer E. Cornwell, Presidential Leadership of Public Opinion (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1966) p. 165; Joseph M. Jones, The Fifteen Weeks (New York: The Viking Press, 1955) pp. 237-238.

[3]Ralph B. Levering, The Public and American Foreign Policy, 1918-1976 (New York: William Morrow and Company, Inc., 1978).

[4]Maxwell McCombs and Donald L. Shaw, "The Agenda-Setting Function of the Mass Media", Public Opinion Quarterly 36 (1972).

[5]Bernard C. Cohen, The Public's Impact on Foreign Policy (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1973) pp. 107-112.

[6]Cf., Murray Edelman, The Symbolic Uses of Politics (Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1964).

[7]Cf., Harold D. Lasswell, Nathan Leites and Associates, Language of Politics: Studies in Quantitative Semantics (Cambridge: The M.I.T. Press, 1965).

[8]Cf., W. Lance Bennett, "Myth, Ritual and Political Control", Journal of Communication Volume 30, Number 4 (Autumn, 1980).

[9]Joseph H. deRivera, The Psychological Dimension of Foreign Policy (Columbus, OH: Charles E. Merrill Publishing Co., 1968).

[10]Gerald Hopple, ed., Biopolitics, Political Psychology and International Politics (New York: St. Martin's Press, Inc., 1982), See especially, G. Mathew Bonham and Micheal J. Shapiro, "The Cognitive Process Approach to Planning and Policy Analysis", pp. 37-59.

[11]Michael P. Sullivan, International Relations: Theories and Evidence (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1976) p. 58.

[12]Charles W. Kegley, Jr. and Eugene R. Wittkopf, American Foreign Policy: Pattern and Process, 2nd ed. (New York: St. Martin's Press, Inc., 1982) p. 246.

[13]Ibid.

[14]Ibid., p. 247.

[15]Daniel J. Elazar, Cities of the Prairie (New York: Basic Books, 1970) p. 257, Cited in Ibid., p. 247.

[16]Hans J. Morganthau, Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace, 4th ed. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1967) p. 85.

[17]Ibid., p. 84.

APPENDIX

TABLE 1: (U.S.-AIPO-March 28, 1947)

Do you approve or disapprove of the bill asking for 250 million dollars to aid Greece? Asked of a national cross-section of persons who had heard or read about the issue of aid to Greece.

	Yes	No	No Opinion
National total:	56%	32%	12%

TABLE 2: (NORC-April 3, 1947)

1. Do you approve of our government providing money to Greece to help her recover from war?

2. Do you approve or disapprove of our sending military supplies to help the Greek government?

3. Do you approve or disapprove of our sending military supplies to help Turkey?

	Economic-	Military-	
	Greece	Greece	Turkey
Approve	67%	37%	30%
Disapprove	27%	53%	54%
No Opinion	6%	10%	16%

TABLE 3: (NORC-July 15, 1947)

Do you approve or disapprove of our Government's policy of sending aid to Greece? Asked in June 1947.

Approve	55%
Disapprove	19%
Qualified approval	11%
Undecided	15%

TABLE 4: (U.S.-AIPO-March, 1947)

Do you think that the present government has the backing of the majority--that is, more than half--of the Greek people?	Yes	33%
	No	25
	No opinion	42
Do you think that the present Turkish government has the backing of the majority--that is, more than half--of the Turkish people?	Yes	34%
	No	14
	No opinion	52

TABLE 5:

Indulgent	# Uses	Deprivation	# Uses
Free/Freedom	14	Gravity of the situation	1
Liberation	2	National security	2
Peace-loving	1	Invasion	1
Self-supporting	2	Enemy occupation	1
Self-respecting	1	Internal strife	1
Independent	3	Tragic conditions	1
Economically sound	1	Militant minorities	1
National integrity	3	Misery	1
Preservation of Order	1	Exploitation	2
Representative government	1	Political chaos	1
Democracy	6	Terrorist activites	1
		Communists	2
		Border violations	1
		Coercion	4
		Aggressive movements	1
		Impose	3
		Totalitarian regimes	1
		Intimidation	1
		Oppression	1
		Suppression	1
		Endanger	1

TABLE 6: (U.S.-AIPO-November 2, 1947)

Would you favor or oppose lending Western European countries like England, France, Holland, and Norway about 20 billion dollars over the next four years to be spent for goods to be bought in this country?

Yes	26%
No	48%
Qualified	4%
No opinion	22%

TABLE 7: (U.S.-AIPO-November 2, 1947)

Would you favor or oppose sending Western European countries like England, France, Holland and Norway about 20 billion dollars worth of goods from this country in order to improve conditions and keep those countries from going Communistic?

Yes	47%
No	33%
Qualified	4%
No opinion	16%